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Abstract: At the outset ‘mission creep’ is a military phenomenon, denoting uncontrolled and unintended mission
development. Even the best-laid plans may become obsolete if they run against the facts on the ground, and mission
creep may result. Mission creep also plagues arguments, as when arguments end up in unrelated topics, larger
targets, or clusters of topics. Our paper explores possible mutual benefits of applying the resources of argumentation
theory and military theory to one another.
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1. Introduction
The road to hell may indeed be paved with good intentions but that hardly means we should give
up good intentions. Rather, it means we should be prepared to look for exit ramps whenever we
find ourselves going down that road. This sage advice is easier to give than follow, and perhaps
nowhere is it more important but harder to heed than in military actions. Consider these
examples:
1

Example 1
(i) A NATO military column is transporting a medical officer from headquarters to a
forward operating base some distance from the nearest village in a remote, desolate and
war-torn countryside. The convoy slows as a burka-dressed mother with a young,
apparently lifeless child in her arms approaches. The doctor has a professional
obligation to help, so he signals the commander to stop, and the commander agrees.
Soldiers are ordered out of the armoured trucks and, mindful of the possibilities for
suicide vests and IEDs, establish a cordon at a safe distance around the doctor and the
woman.
(ii) The doctor renders a diagnosis of severe de-hydration and provides water. The woman
and child are soon on their way and the military personnel return to their vehicles.
(iii) There is a sigh of relief all around because although it was not part of their mission, it
was a good deed easily and safely achieved. It involved some risk for the soldiers but it
was important for the desperate mother.
(iv) Later, a local informer reports that the mother and child were killed because they had
received medical attention from foreign infidels without the permission from the village
elder, in contravention of local customs.
If the villagers’ customs or their reaction had been different, this would have been a success
story. Unfortunately, it is not.
Example 2
(2) In response to the 9-11 terrorist attack, a US-led coalition initiated a military
offensive against Al-Qaida strongholds in Afghanistan where the Taliban government
had given them safe haven. The Taliban was driven from power, hard-liners fled to
Pakistan, and a more US-friendly government was installed. More coalition forces
arrived to protect the government, coming under NATO command in 2003.1
By 2008, political ambitions had broadened and the nations participating in the UNsanctioned, NATO-led coalition issued a press release identifying four goals (NATO,
2008):
(i) Building an enduring, stable, secure, and prosperous democratic state;
(ii) Defending such basic values as freedom, democracy, and human rights;
(iii) Eliminating terrorism and extremism as threats to stability;
(iv) Establishing and maintaining a secure environment and good governance. That
vision was presented 6 years after the campaign started – and 12 years ago.
The first example is a specific and localized incident: the actions of the soldiers were not part of
their assigned mission. They were in response to the specific circumstances and conditions in
which the soldiers found themselves. The second example is more global: the actions of the
military forces shifted into a more defensive posture from its initial offense-minded orientation,
but that change was not in response to any specific incidents or military strategy. Rather, it was
part of a larger transformation of their mission that was mainly dictated by governmental policy.
1

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was established on Dec. 20, 2001 with UN SC mandate 1386.
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These two examples sit at opposite ends of a spectrum of phenomena that fall under the
rubric “Mission Creep” – the unintended but almost inexorable tendency of military actions to
broaden beyond their original scope. A military force that sets out on a humanitarian intervention
to build schools may become embroiled in a civil war when it defends those schools from attack;
carefully delineated attempts at temporarily stabilizing a weak government slowly evolve into
wholesale nation building if the institutional supports fail to take root; when the conditions allow
it, there is little to stop a military action that begins as part of a retaliation from turning into an
opportunistic war of conquest (see Tierney, 2017).
Although the specific term mission creep is relatively new,2 the phenomenon itself is not.
Nor is its usage confined to military operations, finding footholds in the languages of non-profit
organizations, politics, education, and law enforcement. Surprisingly, it has not entered into the
discourse of argumentation theory. We say “surprisingly” for two reasons: first, there are quite
obvious counterparts to the phenomenon in argumentation; and second, the constellation of
concepts associated with the military is routinely paired with the constellation of concepts
associated with argumentation because of the ubiquity of the argument-is-war metaphor and the
Dominant Adversarial Models (“DAM accounts”) for argumentation (see Cohen, 1995; Rooney,
2010, for the former; see Bailin & Battersby, 2017; Stevens & Cohen, 2018, for the latter). While
it would certainly be feasible and very likely be fruitful to deploy the resources of argumentation
theory to explore and explain the phenomenon – perhaps as the dangerous result of chasing a
Red Herring down a Slippery Slope – in this paper, we will reverse directions and exploit the
resources of military theory to identify the sources of mission creep in argumentation and,
ultimately, strategies for controlling it.

2. Mission creep
The two examples above offer a full range of comparisons and contrasts. The common points are
manifest: both examples include actions that are re-actions rather than deliberate, pro-active
decisions; both are motivated by good intentions; and both examples end with unintended and
unwanted results. It is their contrasts, however, that are most instructive. The example of the
doctor and the convoy is so localized that it hardly affects the overall mission; it only barely
qualifies as mission creep, but it could be a first step in that direction. In contrast, the change
from retaliation to nation-building is much more global in scope and amounts to a wholesale
make-over of the mission. The first incident involves what was potentially a one-off, isolated
incident while the second case entails a permanent change with long-term consequences. The
first involves a minor change in tactics; the second operates at the level of strategy.
For our purposes, however, the most important contrast is between the causes of those
changes because that is where lessons for argumentation can be gleaned. The strategic change
was largely dictated from above by policy changes while it was unexpected facts on the ground
that were the occasion for the tactical improvisation. As a first approximation, we will
characterize the contrast as the difference between “top-down” and “bottom-up” causation. That
is, however, only a first approximation because the lines of influence go both ways. It is, of
course, entirely possible for there to be some tension between the dictates arising from the
specific situation in the field and the strategic mandates emanating from policy considerations.
2

Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mission_creep) dates the term to 1993 and the UN military operations in
Somalia; Merriam-Webster (https://www.merriam-webster.com/time-traveler) puts the first occurrence in 1991.

3

However, it is also possible that the tactical dictates from below and the strategic mandates from
above complement and reinforce one another. When that sort of harmonic resonance occurs,
incremental mission creep risks accelerating into an all-out mission stampede. This description
conforms reasonably well to the series of historical events that began with the assassination of an
archduke in June of 1914 and within a month became the Great War to End All Wars. Sadly, we
also think this description comfortably fits the all-too-common pattern of small differences in
standpoint leading to disagreements that grow into disputes before spiralling out of control into
full-blown and very uncomfortable arguments in the most pejorative sense of the term.
3. Mission creep from the bottom up
The first incident illustrates one of the major sources of mission change. The decision to stop
was triggered by the specific situation. What initially looked like a good thing to do resulted in a
terrible outcome. The column commander should not have stopped, even though the doctor, who
also out-ranked him, insisted. The column leader’s orders were simple enough. So was the good
doctor’s obligation to help. Analysing the story gives us some important aspects; the order was
formulated based on cultural, demographically and situational awareness, and signed by an
officer in charge. The road ahead included multiple threats, and even though the mother looked
innocent enough, a remote-controlled explosive device could have been used, with an equally
devastating outcome.
The facts on the ground matter, and unexpected facts matter in unexpected ways. When
we refer to facts on the ground, that can be taken so literally as to mean the local topography –
hills, ravines, marshes, etc. – but can also take the form of a woman with a sick child, bad
weather, logistical snafus, an outbreak of the flu, or shifts in alliances.
The facts matter in both argumentation and military actions, and so do changes in the
facts. In military operations, changes in the facts on the ground dictate changes in tactics – as
well they should – but the more that the facts on the ground dictate tactical responses the more
they can become detached from strategic considerations of long-term consequences and how
specific actions will contribute to or detract from the mission’s overall goals. Here is an
illustration showing ideal cases and cases of mission creep.
Figure 1
Mission creep
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Missions are closely related to war narratives (see Kvernbekk & Bøe-Hansen, 2017). A
war narrative represents an existential, vitally important vision of what is to be achieved. It
provides the framework for policy, the foundation of “truths” that the populace can accept.
Furthermore, it presents a war logic thought to be beyond dispute; a “handbook” for why the
mission is to be undertaken and how to be argued for. The term Area of Operations (AO) is a
generic term in military operations for the conduct of combat and non-combat activities. The AO
is an area within the Joint Operations Area (JOA) defined by the joint force commander for
conducting operations (NATO, 2019). It describes most often the specific area assigned to a
subordinate commander for a specific mission. The AO is where the facts on the ground are to be
found, at least a certain set of them. They may prove to be amenable to the mission, or they may
function as obstacles or hindrances that thwart or prevent the course of the original mission, or
make the target of original mission unattainable altogether.
The most egregious case would be forces operating in the total absence of any orders
founded on a clear and consistent mission statement or, what amounts to about the same thing, in
the absence of any discipline. They would in effect be rogue forces. Something similar will result
if there is no single, coherent voice at the top of the chain of command, which is often the case
since so many modern military operations are carried out by coalitions whose constituent
countries have their own political agendas. A vacuum at the top opens the door for mission creep
from the bottom. Of course, the mere existence of an articulated, univocal statement offers no
guarantees of success: it also has to be effectively communicated throughout the chain of
command and its implementation among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels needs to be
well-integrated (see Taw & Peters, 1995). Otherwise, the results are again likely to be the same.
Things might have worked out differently in our example of the convoy, the doctor, and
the woman with her child, but we cannot know how the story would have played out in the event
that, say, the village elder had decided that forgiveness or perhaps even gratitude was an
appropriate and acceptable response. We can imagine that the mission accomplishing its task and
reaching closure, but we can just as easily imagine the local success story leading to greater
commitment with disastrous results. It’s precisely that uncertainty that is salient and so

5

dangerous. It is why all NATO operational orders explicitly state: “Avoid Mission Creep”. But
equally salient is that mission creep is only something to “avoid” rather than something that is
“strictly forbidden” (see Siegel, 2000). The phenomenon is too complex for a simple prohibition,
too inevitable to be completely eradicated, and too unpredictable to be effectively controlled;
sometimes it even surprises us and works out for the best. It is, in a word, too human.
So, too, is argumentation. Arguments often take us in unintended directions.

4. Mission creep from the top down
The second case is more in line with the common conception of mission creep due to military or
political overreach, and for which some measure of culpability needs to be assigned. Nobody
signed on to 18 years in Afghanistan, so should not someone be held accountable for creating
this Frankenstein’s monster?3
Part of the felt need to assign blame is because we (speaking now as Westerners from
NATO countries) have to share in the responsibility for the current political, military, and
humanitarian quagmire but we were supposed to be “the good guys” there. The coalition forces
in Afghanistan are under UN and NATO auspices for humanitarian purposes, so it was easy for
the soldiers to be thought of, and not just by themselves, as a “force for good.” The finger of
blame has to point somewhere else, and there are not many options besides higher up the
command chain. A case in point is the Norwegian military presence in Afghanistan, 2001-2014.
In 2016 an evaluation was published; the gist of which is as follows: In the big picture Norway
did little of significance. At the outset the Norwegian government had three main objectives for
the Afghanistan engagement; theirs was an effort with the US and NATO, against international
terror and for a better Afghanistan – a stable and democratic Afghan state through long-term
development aid and peace diplomacy. In the end the most important objective was the alliance
dimension; supporting the US and secure NATO’s relevance – which is considered achieved.
The second objective was partly achieved while the third is still not achieved (NOU 2016).
In general outline, the good-guy characterization applies to most international operations
since the end of the Cold War. They have been charged with promoting peace, peace-keeping, or
security assistance, often in conjunction with a variety of broadly humanitarian goals from
building schools and hospitals to vaccinating children and drilling water wells. They are indeed
“forces for good,” at least according to the contributing nations as a designation for internal
political consumption. Where, then, is the culpability?
Only in rare cases will culpability for a mission creep gone awry lie with a specific
individual. The fault is often embedded in the entire chain of command because the problem of
mission creep often arises from interactions between different levels of command when planning
and executing a military campaign rather than from a single level. On the other hand, it might not
be the plan or the orders that lead to mission creep, but the people and their interpretation of the
order. Or it could be neither of the above: It could be due to cultural problems spiced with
religious divisions and different languages, history and traditions.
The realization of political ambitions into military operations takes place through a chain
of command where each level has its own roles and functions – and its own responsibilities
(NATO, 2019). A brief, schematic account of the levels of command will identify four
Or as Clausewitz formulated it: “No one starts a war – or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so – without first
being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.”
3
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components: (1) the political and governmental institutions, (2) the high-level military-strategic
command, (3) the mid-level operational command, and (4) the tactical level making decisions for
the soldiers on the ground.
Figure 2:
Levels of Command

While some parts are unique to each command level, there is a need to have some overlap with
the next level to ensure the effective transfer of tasks between the levels. There is also some
shared responsibility for those tasks, in the sense of shared duties to see they are accomplished,
which, if things go awry in the end, become a shared responsibility, in the sense of culpability.
Through the political-strategic dialogue, the military-strategic command level conveys
the strategic goals and ambitions as a campaign plan or a strategic directive. The operational
command level translates the strategic goals into an operational plan with concrete tasks for
subordinate tactical units. To a far greater extent than the political level, the interactions between
the strategic, operational, and tactical levels are dynamic and go both ways. Any level can, and
should, open lines of communication between representatives from subordinate and higher
levels, to coordinate planning and ensure that implementation is in accordance with higher level
intentions. Because each and every link in the chain of command can be an occasion for poor
communication or miscommunication, mis-relayed or modified orders, or failures of execution
of various sorts, each interface represents an opening for a shift in the mission.
Even the best command cannot eliminate all possibilities for mission creep from below.
There are too many factors to take into account, especially when the campaign is waged on
foreign soil: climate, meteorology, geography, topography and demography may be relatively
easy to prepare for because the range of possibilities is limited and it identifies what can be
expected. The same cannot always be said for complications arising from cultural dynamics,
political reactions, religious influences, and social structures.
What the best command can control, however, is the internal dynamics that allow for
mission creep from above. This applies to both the planning and execution stages of the
operation. The problems in execution fall into three categories: failures of communication,
inadequately drawn lines of responsibility, and operational inefficiencies. While these may be
exceedingly difficult to eradicate or control, or even just identify, in practice, they do not pose
any insuperable obstacles for theory.
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We are tempted to say that the situation is reversed with respect to planning – that the
theoretical obstacles are insuperable while the practical problems are more or less routine –
except for the fact that when it comes to military operations, nothing is ever routine. Still, the
temptation is there because there is a grain of truth in it: since execution is never routine, the
very idea of perfect planning is either an aspirational ideal or a delusion for political propaganda.
No amount of planning can prepare for all the possible contingencies. If the planning stages were
able to issue a complete flow-chart or algorithm with instructions for every situation that could
arise, life would easy for those at the operational level. It is not. Planning is an open-ended
process. The more contingencies accommodated, the better the plans are and the better-off the
operation will be. To that end, wise planners will facilitate the inclusion of all relevant
perspectives, from the grandest, most global political goals to that of the individual soldier on the
ground. They will assess as many relevant factors as intelligence, time, and resources permit in
order to optimize the balance between political goals and military capabilities. This is where the
construction of possible scenarios and hypothetical reasoning is useful; it yields guidelines of the
forms: “If x happens, use plan B, but if y happens, use plan C, etc.” There is of course a limit to
how many alternative plans of action are possible and feasible to make. Moreover, plans B and C
could contain ideas that in the case of x or y would make it advisable for us to alleviate, forestall,
reinforce, repair, or otherwise alter the overall goals, albeit leaving as much of the original target
intact and attainable. That is, the best planning will take as input all the foreseeable
contingencies and yield as output a clear mission statement with realistic, achievable, and welldefined goals.
And one more thing: because the range of possible contingencies inevitably outstrips
even the best laid plans of politicians and soldiers, no mission statement should be regarded as
complete, or, for that matter, even minimally acceptable, if it does not explicitly include attention
to an end state and exit strategies. Otherwise, we will be at the mercy of whatever mission creep
comes our way. The example of Afghanistan is Exhibit A and a prime cautionary tale: Even
though it has reduced its footprint and focused its resources just on Kabul, the capital, NATO
still operates in Afghanistan. Does NATO even have an exit strategy? Did it ever? An endemic
problem for war narratives is that their rhetorical function in justifying action often precludes any
space for articulating any exit strategies.
We will leave it to historians and military theorists to argue about how many wellintentioned campaigns have come a-cropper for want of an exit strategy and ended up as
unmitigated disasters. We want to raise the same question about arguments:
How many arguments have gone off the rails as the arguers have dug in their
heels, changed the “mission”, and lost control of the narrative to disastrous
ends, all because surrender was unacceptable and no other exit strategy was
envisioned?
Planning has to include taking contingencies into account; contingencies can change the mission;
operations can go bad; so high among the contingencies that need to be considered are those that
concern first, a mission’s ends – its goals – and second, the end of the mission, including both
situations in which the goals have been met and outcomes in which they have not. It is, perhaps,
understandable why arguers pay little attention to this; it is less understandable why
argumentation theorists pay so little attention to it.
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4. Mission creep in arguments
Arguments, in the relevant sense, are complex and dynamic series of events that unfold over
time. They can seem to have lives of their own that include growth and change. If they were just
static sequences of timeless propositions to be assessed wholly on the basis of their inferential
relations, we would not have to worry about mission creep. Instead, we need to consider the
variety of changes that can occur in the course of an argument, like the following:
(1) We start arguing for one thesis but end up arguing for another. Again, this could be either
positive or negative: negative, if the new thesis is “a bridge too far“, an unjustifiable or
unsuccessful over-reach; a positive if the new thesis is an improvement over the original
one in response to the push-back – i.e., the feedback in the form of objections and
questions – from the opposition, arguing in order to establish T, but continue arguing in
order to further explore and understand the thesis and all its ramifications (benign
enthusiasm?).
(2) We begin by arguing against an opponent’s thesis, but find ourselves arguing for a thesis
of our own, or, conversely, we start out arguing for something but soon find ourselves on
the defensive, perhaps regarding the thesis in question but perhaps in defense of what was
thought to be a safe or even unacknowledged prior assumption.
Both examples involve the targeted conclusion or standpoint in the argument and both are in
response to the dialectical engagement, the counterpart to tactical changes dictated from below.
Arguments also change in ways that are more policy-driven, like the top-down cases:
(3) We start arguing about one topic but end up arguing about something else. As in military
mission creep, this could be either a negative development, if we end following a Red
Herring, or a positive one, if the earlier engagement reveals what we really should have
been pursuing all along.
(4) We start arguing about topic A, but because of “clustering” (see Dascal & Knoll 2011),
we end up arguing about topics B, C, and D – opening new “fronts” but making progress
on none of them. Even if the direct conceptual connections between, say, gay rights and
abortion or between climate change and national security are weak and indirect, the
contingent political, psychological, and social connections are more than enough to
entangle us.
In these examples, the entire argument has veered off-course as the subject matter of the
argument, and not just the concluding thesis, has changed. The next two examples might concern
the arguers more than the subject matter:
(5) After getting the opponents to accede to our initial thesis or proposal, we continue
arguing in an attempt to persuade and then to convince them. The kind of victory has
come to matter, and that means somehow changing or transforming our opponents.
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Victory in an argument that does not entail any cognitive change in the arguers, like military
victories without any political change, will never last for very long (even if you’ve “got them by
the balls”4).
(6) Similarly, but less benignly, we may start arguing in order to win an argument by
defeating the opponents but end up trying to trounce, convert, or even humiliate them.
Competitive excess makes it personal.
From one perspective, these do fit the pattern of mission creep: incremental changes in the goals
in response to the opportunities that present themselves. However, the difference between
targeting an argument and targeting an arguer has far too much significance for argumentation
theory to conflate the cases.
Finally, let us offer one more example to illustrate another important phenomenon in
argumentation: a change in the dialog type, i.e., a change in kind of argument itself.
(7) We may enter an adversarial argument in order to establish a thesis, say, or get a proposed
course of action accepted, but in the course of arguing we turn to less confrontational
negotiating or something even more cooperative like joint deliberating in order to make
some progress towards a resolution.
Unfortunately, belligerence tends to ratchet up, so that things more often move in the opposite
direction, but we find some comfort in the idea that ratcheting down the adversariality is at least
a possibility (For recent discussions, see Rooney, 2010; Stevens & Cohen, 2018; Casey, 2020).
Ubiquitous as it may be, mission creep in argumentation is not inevitable, and this is
where we can take our cue from military theory. The military analogies provide some guidance.
The distinction between mission creep arising from tactical maneuvering and top-down changes
due to policy and strategy evolution has counterparts in argumentation, so it provides an
especially helpful lens for viewing the phenomena.
Most obviously, multi-party argumentation in practice is almost entirely a matter of
tactical responses in response to reasons, objections, questions, and replies. If we have a clear
and articulate standpoint, we can prepare lines of reasoning in advance, anticipate some
objections, and have a stock of answers ready (like plan B and plan C). Thus, the first thing
needed is the same kind of advance planning that results in a clear and articulate mission
statement for military actions and a defined exit strategy. And the second thing needed is, just as
before, the right kind of discipline to stay on message. We might not think of discipline as a
particularly argumentative virtue, but there is an art to finding and staying focused on the mean
between completely rigid tunnel vision and overreacting to every goad and provocation in an
argument.
The pattern of top-down mission creep is less immediately applicable because there are
no exact counterparts to the four-part chain of command but the general lessons still hold: even if
it is not a matter of communication between distinct, independent entities, it is important to have
a coherent and integrated game plan for staying on track; there may be no need to draw lines
demarcating different areas of responsibility, but arguers do need to take responsibility for their
argumentation, and “operational inefficiencies” in execution can still gum the works. In a word,
This runs counter to the wisdom embodied in the quotation, “If you’ve got them by the balls, their hearts and
minds will follow,” popularized during the Vietnam War, and variously attributed to President Lyndon Johnson and
General William Westmoreland, as well as, probably apocryphally, President Theodore Roosevelt.
4
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that the upper echelons of the argumentative chain of command need to control mission creep is
a kind of wisdom: the wisdom to know when and how to argue, but for the specific problem of
mission creep it is the wisdom not to enter arguments without exit strategies for all the
foreseeable contingencies.

5. Conclusion
We hope that this exercise in comparing military actions and argumentation has succeeded in
three things: first, simply identifying the phenomenon of mission creep in argumentation,
recognizing its significance, and bringing it to the attention of argumentation theorists for further
theorizing; second, using the military model as a diagnostic tool both for understanding the
causes for different kinds of mission creep and for bringing such ameliorative virtues as
preparedness and the discipline to stay on topic into focus; and third, revealing just how
important, and how difficult, it is to consider exit strategies in argumentation.
Where this exercise admittedly falls short is that having come to the recognition of how
important exit strategies are for argumentation – and an appreciation for why it is most important
precisely when the appropriateness of a covering “war narrative for arguing” makes formulating
exit strategies most difficult – we have not made any headway at all on that problem. In part, it is
a failure due to the absence of a well-developed body of military theorizing on the subject to
serve as a template. But we like to think that it is also at least in part because we are trying to
model the focus and discipline needed to resist what would be a rather appalling example of
mission creep.

References
Bailin, S., & Battersby, M. (2017). DAMned if you do, DAMned if you don't: Cohen's "Missed
opportunities."OSSA Conference Archive
90. https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA11/papersandcommentaries/90
Casey, J, (2020). Adversariality and argumentation. Informal Logic, 40(1), 77-108.
von Clausewitz, C. (1976) On war. (M. Howard, & P. Paret Eds. and Trans.) Princeton:
Princeton University Press. (Original work published 1832).
Cohen, D. (1995). Argument is war...and war is hell: Philosophy, education, and metaphors for
argumentation. Informal Logic, 17(2), 177-188.
Dascal, M., & Knoll, A. (2011). ‘Cognitive Synchronous Dichotomization’ in public
argumentation and controversies. In F. Zenker (Ed.), Argumentation: Cognition and
Community [Conference Proceedings]. 9th International Conference of the Ontario Society
for the Study of Argumentation. OSSA: Windsor, ON.
Kvernbekk, T., & Bøe-Hansen, O. (2017). How to win wars: The role of the war narrative. In P.
Olmos (Ed.), Narration as argument (pp. 215-234). Berlin: Springer
NATO. (2008). Bucharest Summit Declaration.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm
NATO. (2019). Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations (AJP-3), Ed.C, Ver. 1

11

NOU. (2016). “En god alliert – Norge i Afghanistan 2001-2014.” (NOU Number 8) [Official
Norwegian Reports, NOU, 2016, p. 8]. A good ally: Norway in Afghanistan (p. 11). 20012014.
Rooney, P. (2010). Philosophy, adversarial argumentation, and embattled reason. Informal
Logic, 30(3), 203-234. https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v30i3.3032
Siegel, A. B. (2000). Mission creep or mission misunderstood? Joint Forces Quarterly, summer
2000, 112-115.
Stevens, K., & Cohen, D. (2018). The attraction of the ideal has no traction on the real: On
adversariality and roles in argument. Argumentation and Advocacy, 1-23.
doi:10.1080/10511431.2018.1504584
Taw, J., & Peters, J. E. (1995) Operations other than war: Implications for the U.S. Army.
California: RAND Corporation.
Tierney, D. (2017) The Logic of Mission Creep. The Atlantic.
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/04/the-logic-of-mission-creep/522438/

12

